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POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE AUTHORIZATION FOR THE
USE OF MILITARY FORCE: UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES?
Katie Magnus

The Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) is a piece of legisla
tion that was enacted shortly after the attacks on September 11, 2001. It states,
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appro
priate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.25
This almost sixty word sentiment laid the ambiguous foundation for the United
States military policy in the post 9/11 era. Following the AUMF was the war
in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, as well as Special Forces operating in nations
where the U.S. was not directly at war. More recently, during the end of the
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Bush Administration and continuing throughout the Obama Administration,
the U.S. utilized Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or drones to combat terrorists and/
or terrorist organizations within nations where the U.S. is not at war. Many of
these policies have created new questions involving legality and the protection of
an individual’s rights. A main implication of the AUMF has been the increased
use of UAVs or drones as a counterterrorism tool. The paper will explore this
implication, the elevation of drone usage, and the repercussions it has for the
United States and the international community as a whole.
Literature Review
Much of the academic literature on this topic can be organized into several dif
ferent camps, a few of which this literature review will feature. The schools of
thought can be divided into about three groups; one group of scholars highlight
the necessity of drones as a tool for the U.S., but also focus on the fact that the
program needs to improve in the future. Another band of academics look at
some of the legal aspects of UAVs, primarily arguing that the legal foundation
utilized by the Bush and Obama Administrations for drone strikes is flawed.
The last school of thought that will be discussed is the grouping of articles
that claim that UAVs are not useful at all, advocating against their usage. The
United States’ drone program is controversial, so there are many topics covered
throughout academia. The pieces reviewed for this paper comprise the most
general classifications.
There are some scholars who showcase concern over the future of the drone
campaign instead of focusing on past missteps of the campaign. A Foreign
Affairs article by Kreps and Zenko recommends specific changes to the current
administration’s policy, beginning with a reminder that the United States, as
a world power, needs to lead by example. There will come a time when the
global development of UAV technology will rival the technology of the United
States. Nations looking to utilize drones for one reason or another will follow
the precedents set by the U.S. Zenko and Kreps state, “Spurred by the United
States’ example, other countries are likely to threaten or conduct drone strikes
in ways that are harmful to U.S. interests, whether by provoking regional ad
versaries or targeting domestic enemies.”26 More specifically, the authors argue
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that the United States needs to restrain from drone proliferation, create an
independent review panel to increase transparency, and that Congress needs to
hold hearings to discuss the use of drones and the legal framework that allows it.27
Other scholars who seriously critique the UAV program as a whole con
trast the above point of view. Instead of offering changes for the future of U.S.
drone policy, they focus on the seriousness of the flaws of the program. Michael
Boyle, writing for International Affairs, explains the theory of blowback; Boyle
is arguing that the positive outcomes of the drone program—killing terrorists—
have not been accurately weighed against the negative outcomes.28 To explain
further, Boyle only looks at the CIA-run drone campaigns outside theatres of
war, and contends that the drone campaigns in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan
undermine the efficacy of local governments and open the door for extremist
Islamic groups to gain recruits.29 He comes to the conclusion that the picture
of the effectiveness of drones is not entirely what it may seem and follows up
that notion with his possible solution; limiting drone strikes to high value
targets (HVTs) only.30
Agreeing with Boyle’s ideological stance on drones, Cronin authored a
piece entitled “Why Drone’s Fail,” and argues against the effectiveness of the
drone campaign as a whole. She begins with the idea that al Qaeda bears little
to no resemblance to the other terrorist groups that have been successfully
“destroyed through decapitation,” or by the targeted killings of drone strikes.31
The disparity lies in the fact that the successfully destroyed groups were charac
terized by a cult of personality, hierarchical structure, and were no more than
ten years old. Al Qaeda is a group that is about twenty-five years old and has
a vast interconnected group of militants at its disposal. Cronin is disputing
the efficacy of using drones as a counterterrorism tool to combat Al Qaeda.
However, she does not dispute the high levels of destruction that have afflicted
al Qaeda. She states that even while the group may be more concerned with
staying alive versus planning attacks on the homeland, al Qaeda still has the
Ibid
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ability to “perpetuate its message.”32 Even if the militaristic wings of al Qaeda
are unfocused and unsuccessful, the public relations campaign the organization
is waging is keeping them afloat, hindering the United States’ long-term goal
of demobilizing the group. While Cronin does not doubt the full efficacy of
the U.S. drone program like Boyle does, she argues that the destruction of Al
Qaeda will not come solely from UAVs.
On the contrary, Byman in his piece “Why Drones Work,” focuses on
the necessity of drones as a tool in the United States’ counterterrorism tool
box, contrasting Cronin’s piece. He argues for targeting higher value terrorists
along with the foot soldiers.33 “It has become more politically palatable for the
United States to kill rather than detain suspected terrorists,” Byman suggests.
He counters the arguments most commonly given by the critics of drones; the
alternatives to drones (i.e. raids) are unreasonable, how difficult it is to counter
terrorism with political or financial means (i.e. bringing nations out of poverty),
and that nonproliferation is essentially futile.34 Byman does address the fact that
drone strikes may be unpopular according to a poll taken in Pakistan in 2012,
but again highlights the lack of better alternatives; “74 percent of Pakistanis
viewed the United States as their enemy, likely in part because of the ongoing
drone campaign…. It is hard to imagine that alternatives to drone strikes, such
as SEAL team raids or cruise missile strikes, would make the United States
more popular.”
Cronin and Byman make convincing arguments in their respective pieces,
and they both touch upon an important piece to the puzzle when it comes to
drone policies, the legal basis for UAV strikes. Much of the legal framework for
counterterrorism measures taken since 2001 comes from the Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (AUMF). Cronin does concede that the authorization
from Congress was most likely a necessity during that time, but she disagrees
with what the authorization has morphed into. The ambiguous phrasing of the
legislation may have been originally intentional, but currently, “In this endless
contest, the United States risks multiplying its enemies and heightening their
incentives to attack the country.”35 Byman does not completely agree with that
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conclusion, but he does address the fact that the AUMF is twelve-plus years
old, and it may not sufficiently cover the UAV program in its entirety.
Research Findings
Because much of the United States UAV program is shrouded in secrecy for
national security reasons, it is difficult to decipher what are the concrete poli
cies of the U.S. President Barack Obama, State Department Legal Advisor
Harold Koh, and Central Intelligence Agency Director John Brennan have all
given speeches on the topic, which are continually referenced by government
officials when drone policy questions are asked. Each set of remarks, President
Obama’s, Koh’s, and Brennan’s, try to showcase the reasoning behind U.S.
targeted killings by the way of drones. The AUMF was cited as being the legal
basis for the actions taken. Other measures such as the increased transparency,
though seemingly hollow, were outlined as well. In President Obama’s speech
at National Defense University, he references written counterterrorism policy
standards entitled, “Presidential Policy Guidance,” which outline the exact
standards for the use of lethal force.36 Essentially, the policy standards reiterate
what the White House and government agencies have been explaining to the
American people. Lethal force is not an alternative for prosecution; it ideally
is used only when there is a “continuing imminent threat to U.S. persons.”37
The appropriate members of Congress have continuously been informed, the
Department of Justice has been consulted to run legal analysis, but yet the
President still maintains his authority to take action as he sees fit in a lawful
manner, a reminder of the powerful legal authority the executive branch holds.
Harold Koh, the State Department Legal Advisor, took a different approach
in his speech at the American Society of International Law. Koh outlined what
was dubbed an “Emerging ‘Obama-Clinton Doctrine’,” which is comprised of
four different areas to which the U.S. is committed.38 The four areas correspond
to the ideas that have been consistently iterated by the Obama administration,
“…challenges of the twenty-first century can’t be met by any one leader or any
36
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one nation,” simply saying that the international community needs to become
more interdependent.39 These elements frame the United States as the multi
lateral actor that former Secretary of State Clinton and President Obama may
want the nation to be. Koh states, “U.S. targeting practices, including lethal
operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with
all applicable law, including the laws of war.” It is the AUMF that authorizes
the U.S. to use force from a domestic standpoint. There are different interna
tional laws in place regarding the usage of force or more specifically targeted
killings, however they disagree with the U.S.’s position and actions, so the
federal government defers to domestic law. Koh’s remarks seemed to be aimed
towards satisfying the public and possibly other U.S. representative’s calls for
justification of the executive branch’s actions. The phrasing “ comply with all
applicable law” aims to increase the legitimacy of Koh’s claims and attempts
to decrease the legitimacy of the criticisms of the drone program. Further, it
sets the precedent that the only legal framework that matters is the U.S.’s, not
international law.
At Harvard Law, John Brennan takes a more hawkish position stating, “…
As President Obama has stated on numerous occasions, we reserve the right
to take unilateral action if or when other governments are unwilling or un
able to take the necessary actions themselves.” Continuing, Brennan almost
walks back that previous statement by pointing out that the U.S. cannot just
use military force whenever it pleases, because the U.S. respects international
law and state sovereignty.40 Brennan tries to shed light on the perspectives of
intelligence agencies and the military by explaining that the face of warfare is
changing, underscoring the necessity of drones. The U.S. military does not face
the same type of combatant as they once did; al Qaeda wears no uniform and
does not carry weapons openly. Brennan takes a similar path as Koh by offer
ing what seem to be justifications for U.S. missteps; he argues that President
Obama has actually increased transparency by allowing the release of budgetary
information, reconstituting the Intelligence Oversight Board, and declassifying
legal memos.41
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These remarks made by high-level officials are more or less the public ver
sion of the United States current UAV policy. Critics and skeptics are in no way
satisfied with these claims and arguments because many of what are arguably
the biggest questions surrounding the policies are unanswered. This has led to
an outpouring of critiques regarding the current status of the program, how
the U.S. should handle the program in the future, and assessments regarding
the morality of the program as a whole.
Essentially, there are groups within the U.S. and throughout the interna
tional community that would like to see some hard data, some specifics, on the
United States UAV program. There have been conflicting reports throughout
news outlets on numbers of civilian causalities and the locations of U.S. drone
strikes. Some specifics can be found; since 2008, the U.S. has administered
1,000 plus drone strikes in Afghanistan. As of July 2013, the British had con
ducted 299 drone strikes in Afghanistan comparatively. From 2008 onward,
the U.S. has launched 48 drone strikes in Iraq, approximately 145 in Libya,
400 in Pakistan, 100 plus in Yemen, under 20 in Somalia, and possibly one in
the Philippines.42
Conclusions can be drawn when hard data is analyzed. While Cronin
argues against the use of drones, she does cede the point that, “Political scien
tists Patrick Johnston and Anoop Sarbahi recently found that drone strikes in
northwestern Pakistan from 2007 to 2011 resulted in a decrease in the number
and lethality of militant attacks in the tribal areas where they were conducted.”43
There is definitely effectiveness to the weaponry; otherwise it would not be
used on such a widespread scale. The effectiveness is only questioned insofar as
the actual toll of civilian loss of life, and whether or not that leads to negative
long-term effects, i.e. blowback. Cronin and Boyle, for example, both argue
that the lasting impact drones have are adverse to the goals the administra
tion is trying to achieve. The drones-first counterterrorism policy can be used
as a recruiting tool for extremist organizations, undermine the stability and
confidence of local governments, and increase anti-American sentiment. All
of these implications have a high probability of being accurate. The “Times
Square bomber” explained that his motives were directly related to drone strikes.
More recently, the relationship between the United States and Pakistan has
42
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been strained because the Pakistani government is facing hostile opposition to
U.S. drone strikes. While the Pakistani government has often condemned the
strikes in public, it is now widely known that they give the U.S. permission
in private. In November 2013 there were protests in Peshawar, activists claim
that the U.S. is hindering Pakistan’s peace process with the Pakistani Taliban,
as they were just about to begin negotiations when a drone strike killed a top
Taliban leader.44
Drone strikes conducted on the Pakistani Taliban seem a long way from
the policies described in the Authorization for the Use of Military Force. While
the ambiguousness of the authorization is partly necessary to avoid obstacles
regarding terrorist organizations changing their names to avoid sanctions,
Cronin explains, “Washington now finds itself in a permanent battle with an
amorphous and geographically dispersed foe, one with an increasingly marginal
connection to the original 9/11 plotters. In this endless contest, the United
States risks multiplying its enemies and heightening their incentives to attack
the country.” Daniel Byman in his article contradicting Cronin’s piece does
agree that Washington needs to improve drone policy to an extent. Speaking
in regards to the targeting of Anwar Awlaki, the U.S. citizen that was targeted
in Yemen, Byman states, “Yet with the war on terrorism almost 12 years old
and bin Laden dead, critics, such as the Georgetown University law professor
Rosa Brooks, have begun questioning whether the AUMF still justifies drone
strikes today. As Brooks has argued, ‘Many of the groups now being identified
as threats don’t fall clearly under the AUMF’S umbrella -- and many don’t pose
a significant danger to the United States.’”
The decision-making when it comes to deciding on drone strikes has been
compared to a hostage situation, where police are not barred by the law from
killing a hostage taker if they have a clear shot. Obviously there are some
major differences between the urgency of a hostage situation at home and
terrorists plotting miles away, but Mr. Leiter, former head of the National
Counterterrorism Center, vocalizes that “[the president’s reliance on strikes]
is far from a lurid fascination with covert action and special forces. It’s much
44
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more practical. He’s the president. He faces a post-Abdulmutallab situation,
where he’s being told people might attack the United States tomorrow.”45
On top of the immediate policy implications are concerns of a drones arms
race. The number of states with any type of drones has almost doubled since
2004, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office. It is predicted
that the civilian and military drone market will reach $8.4 billion by 2018,
which will actually only be a portion of global defense spending which is sup
posed to hit $1.9 trillion by the end of 2017.46 While the conjecture of a drone
arms race may be farfetched, the advancements made in drone technology
will make it easier to enter far away conflicts. Previously, when heads of state
contemplated military action, they had to consider boots on the ground and
the impact that would have. Now and in the future they will have the option
to send an UAV to complete the obligations troops normally fulfill.
Conclusion
The Authorization for the Use of Military Force is a decade-plus old piece
of legislation that had dictated the legal framework for the United States’ coun
terterrorism policy following September 11, 2001. Developing throughout
the Bush Administration and continuing in the Obama Administration, the
use of UAVs as the main tool for countering terrorists abroad has been a di
rect implication of the AUMF. The ambiguous wording of the document has
allowed President Obama to essentially create his own criteria for enacting
these strikes, concentrating power within the Executive Branch. The costs and
benefits of drone strikes are more easily understood than the legal framework
that justifies them. The use of UAVs has had obvious positive outcomes when
imminent threats are neutralized without having to place troops directly in
harm’s way. Because the program is relatively new, the long-term implications
are difficult to decipher. As mentioned previously, there have been theories
regarding possible blowback, with drone strikes negatively affecting the U.S.’s
goals. Also, the proliferation of drone technology has yet to be seen on a grand
scale, such as an arms race; however, it is a possibility that the technology could
45
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disseminate quickly, leaving questions about international policy regarding the
use of drones.
Foundationally, there is little concrete information on the exact formula
used by President Obama and his advisors when deciding on targets and when
and where to strike. Further, the lack of foresight on the issue creates a vacuum
and feeds speculation on future occurrences. Clearly there are national security
concerns at stake, so full transparency is not an option. However, the United
States needs to begin setting international precedent with the point in mind
that other nations will garner this technology eventually. Essentially, the Obama
administration needs to begin to look at the future of the UAV program instead
of as a short-term solution to the problem of terrorism.
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